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Cloning and Federalism
transcribed remarks of
ASHUTOSH BHAGWAT*
The topic of my talk today is "Cloning and Federalism," two
subjects which one might have thought have absolutely no connection
to each other, but which I hope to convince you should be
inextricably linked in our minds when we think about the wisdom and
constitutionality of regulating cloning. The basic question I seek to
answer here is this: If in fact it is likely that we as a nation will choose
to regulate human cloning in one form or another, which I think is
very likely, at what level of government should that regulation occur?
In particular, is cloning best addressed at the federal level, through a
uniform national standard, or at the state level, with fifty distinctly
nonuniform legislative approaches?
In addressing the above issue, I will make certain assumptions.
First of all, I assume that some form of legislative regulation of
human cloning is extremely likely to occur within the next few years
in this country, including, at a minimum, sharp restrictions on
reproductive cloning. Cloning is an issue with grave moral overtones,
which excites great political passion, and in those circumstances we as
a nation have proven quite unable to resist acting, even when the
arguments in favor of legal intervention are much weaker than in the
case of cloning.
Second, I will assume that no serious individual rights issues are
raised by the regulation of cloning, including even a flat ban on
reproductive cloning. I realize that some people might disagree with
this assumption (not least of all our previous speaker Mark Eibert, of
course), but I tend to agree with Professor Sunstein's remarks during
lunch concluding that, as a realistic matter, it is extremely unlikely that
the modern Supreme Court would recognize any sort of a
constitutional right to clone. Thus, if governments choose to regulate
cloning, in general they can do so.
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law
<bhagvata@uchastings.edu>. I would like to thank the staff of the HASTINGS LAW
JOURNAL for inviting me to participate in this very interesting Symposium.
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Finally, I am going to assume that while there are powerful
arguments for and against the regulation or prohibition of human
cloning, all of the serious arguments in favor of regulation (and
therefore in opposition to cloning) are at their core moral arguments
rather than empirical or neutral policy arguments. Not that there is
anything wrong with morally based legislation, much if not most
existing legislation is founded on moral beliefs, and as a general
matter that is entirely unproblematic. The moral bases of the
arguments against cloning are important, however, because within a
country that is as culturally and morally diverse as ours, there will
inevitably exist a great deal of disagreement regarding the underlying
moral presuppositions which drive such arguments. This, I am sure, is
the most controversial of my assumptions, and so while I cannot fully
defend it here, some explanation is necessary.
First of all, consider commodification, the issue discussed by
Professor Radin today. It seems obvious to me that commodification
is at heart a moral argument because it is based on the presumption
that the application of market morality is inappropriate with respect
to certain kinds of human relationships. But that of course is a
fundamentally moral, and contestable position. Similarly, I think it is
fairly clear that the argument against reproductive cloning based on
concerns about psychological harm to the resulting children is also at
heart moral. This argument assumes that parents of their cloned
children will have unusually powerful expectations of how children
should live their lives, and therefore impose strong restrictions on
their behavior, thereby causing them psychological harm. But what
"harm" is in this context depends on what you think ideal
childrearing should look like. After all, many non-western cultures
are willing to accept and indeed endorse much more directed sorts of
childrearing than we consider "normal," but presumably do not
believe that they are thereby causing psychological harm to their
children.
The last key argument against cloning is the safety argument-
that under current technology cloning is simply not safe enough to be
used for reproductive purposes because of the risks of multiple
unsuccessful attempts before success and of genetic defects in the
resulting child, when finally successful. The safety argument doesn't
sound like a moral one, but I think it is. Regarding the problem of
unsuccessful attempts, this is a safety concern only if we think that the
resulting embryos are worthy of moral consideration-an obviously
disputed point which ties in to all of the violent disputes surrounding
the abortion debate. The argument based on concern about genetic
defects seems a more powerful one, but ultimately this safety
argument is based on the assumption that it is better for a genetically
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defective child not to have been born than to have been born. This
strikes me as an assumption that could at the least be disputed.
Let us assume then that we are going to regulate cloning; the
question then becomes, "Who should do it?" Right now, Congress is
in the process of considering legislation regulating cloning. The
House has already passed an absolute ban on both reproductive and
nonreproductive cloning' and the Senate is currently (as of February
2002) considering both that bill and alternative bills that only ban
reproductive cloning Can they do that? The answer to that question
turns on a particular area of constitutional law having to do with the
powers granted to Congress by the Constitution, and in particular,
with interpretations of the Commerce Clause.
Article I, section 8 of the Constitution gives Congress the power
to regulate commerce among the several states This has become the
dominant source of congressional authority since the New Deal.
Indeed, since the New Deal, especially since the 1940s as confirmed
by two cases upholding the Civil Rights Acts in the 1960s.' the
commerce power was considered to be largely plenary. Today there
are still four Justices of the Supreme Court who believe that Congress
can do absolutely anything it wants in the name of the Commerce
Clause. However, there are five Justices who do not hold this belief.
Since 1995, in two important decisions, United States v. Lopez6 and
United States v. Morrison,7 this majority of the Court has severely
restricted, in some instances, Congress's power under the Commerce
Clause.
Let me provide some background very briefly (for the lawyers
this is familiar territory). The reason that the commerce power has
become plenary is because in a series of cases beginning in the New
Deal and culminating in the Civil Rights Act cases mentioned earlier,
the Supreme Court adopted a number of rules which together
1. I suppose one might be able to make a safety argument against reproductive
cloning based on concerns about the health of the gestating mother. However, it strikes
me as at least controversial to base legislation on such paternalistic concerns when we do
not do the same with respect to other reproductive technologies such as the use of fertility
drugs; and in any event, I am not aware of any reason to think that reproductive cloning
will be unusually dangerous for mothers, in light of our existing system of prenatal care.
2. See H.R. 2505, 107th Cong. (1st Sess. 2001).
3. See Hervey Collette, Senate Tackles Cloning Bans, THE ATLANTA J. AND CONST.,
Feb. 24, 2002, at 5A. In addition to the House bill, the Senate is considering two bills
which ban reproductive but not therapeutic cloning, one proposed by Senator Harkin
(S. 1893) and the other by Senator Feinstein (S. 1758).
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
5. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. U.S., 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung,
379 U.S. 294 (1964).
6. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
7. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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substantially expanded congressional powers under the Commerce
Clause. First of all, the Court held that in the name of regulating
interstate commerce, which is a power textually committed to
Congress, Congress may regulate local intrastate activities which
affect commerce.' Second, the Court held that this power to regulate
is not limited to individual activities which affect interstate commerce.
The individual activities, by themselves, do not have to affect
commerce, so long as the entire class of activities regulated,
considered together, affect commerce. This notion was illustrated in
a case in which the Court held that Congress may regulate a single
farmer's growing of home-consumed wheat because his growth and
consumption of wheat affects the interstate wheat market. Third, the
Court held, especially in the Civil Rights Act cases, that congressional
fact findings regarding effects on commerce will be deferred to, and
that it does not matter what Congress's motives were in adopting the
legislation.'0 It is fairly clear that when the Civil Rights Acts were
passed, Congress's motives were not primarily commercial, but rather
moral. Nonetheless, the Court upheld the legislation as permissible
uses of the commerce power.
In 1995, in United States v. Lopez," and in 2000, in United States
v. Morrison,2 the Supreme Court cut back on this approach. In those
cases, a majority of the Court said that all of the principles I just
described remain viable except when Congress is trying to regulate a
local, non-commercial activity (in Lopez, the possession of a
handgun, and in Morrison, gender-based violence). In those
situations, we do not aggregate and we do not defer to Congress.
Under these cases, then, Congress's power to enact cloning legislation
seems to turn on whether cloning is a commercial activity. I think this
description of the law is fairly uncontroversial. The standard
argument I have seen made in favor of congressional power (the
argument occurs frequently in the flurry of articles that came out after
Dolly) suggested that cloning is a commercial activity. Why?
First of all, cloning occurs in scientific labs, which are substantial
commercial enterprises. At a minimum, all labs purchase their
equipment and get funding from out of state, so they are involved in
lots of interstate commercial activity. Thus cloning is not a
fundamentally local, noncommercial activity such as possessing a
handgun (the regulated activity in Lopez). Second, cloning services
are likely to be bought and sold, as with most fertility services,
8. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
9. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
10. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 257.
11. 514 U.S. 549.
12. 529 U.S. 598.
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making them commercial in nature. Third, people are likely to move
between states to seek out cloning services, creating a commercial
interstate tie. In combination, these arguments (which seem factually
true) probably establish that cloning is a commercial activity and thus
within congressional power. There are, however, counterarguments.
First, not all cloning will be purchased and sold. One can
imagine cloning, early on, when it is still in the research stage, being
provided for couples on a voluntary basis without any payment. The
argument that cloning is by its nature a commercial activity is thus
open to question, at least under current circumstances (after all, there
is no national market in cloning, since human cloning is not yet
possible). In response to the argument that scientific labs are
commercial enterprises and, therefore, cloning is sort of a commercial
activity, one might argue that by that definition almost everything is a
commercial enterprise. Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out in Lopez
that public schools, in a very real sense, are a commercial enterprise.
They hire teachers and buy books from out of state, as well as sending
their graduates out of state. Does that in itself make all schools
subject to federal regulation? The Court said no, and I think the
same argument might be made here, especially when you are talking
about non-profit labs that are engaging in research. Thus, I have real
doubts about the commercial activity justification for congressional
power.
There is also a third reason to question the use of the commerce
power here, and this, I think, ties to my later argument: The
motivation to regulate cloning has essentially nothing to do with
interstate commerce. I should take that back. Why "essentially?"
That's just lawyer talk. The motivation to regulate cloning has
nothing to do with interstate commerce. Indeed, it really has nothing
to do with anything interstate. Whether you call it moral or safety or
whatever, it is purely local policy. This is a clear distinction from
other legislation the Court has upheld. When Congress regulated
wheat growing, it was worried about the interstate market in wheat,
which does in fact exist. When Congress regulates minimum wage or
adopts environmental regulations, it looks local, but the concern is an
interstate, regulatory race to the bottom. The concern is that if you
do not have uniform national regulation, you are going to have states
getting economic pressure to not have minimum wages or
environmental regulations in order to keep businesses from fleeing
that state. I do not see a race to the bottom on cloning regulation as
likely, and in fact think that it is most implausible. There are in fact,
therefore, some real weaknesses in the arguments for congressional
authority in this area. •
Having said that, I think it is unlikely that even the Rehnquist
Court, as currently composed, would go so far as to strike down
July 2002]
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federal cloning legislation, despite the New Federalism. The reason, I
think, is mostly pragmatic. If you took the arguments against federal
power seriously, if you said that not everything that looks commercial
is commercial, and that motivation matters, there are a lot of federal
statutes which regulate local activity with minimal commercial
components and which were clearly morally motivated (including,
most notably, the Civil Rights Acts of 1964) whose constitutionality
would be brought into question, and I cannot imagine that this Court
wants to go so far. As a result, I think as a predictive matter there is
probably Commerce Clause power to regulate cloning, though it
would be an interesting test case. Cloning regulations (like the
proposed, vetoed and now re-proposed partial birth abortion
legislation in Congress) both raise interesting questions of how far
Congress's power is going to be cut back by this Court.
As a final point, I should add that, strangely enough,
congressional authority over nonreproductive cloning is probably
more powerful than it is over reproductive cloning. This is because
nonreproductive cloning is more closely associated with scientific
research at a fairly high technological level, giving it a very strong
commercial component as well as commercial implications.
Reproductive cloning poses a somewhat closer question, but as I said,
Congress probably has power under the Commerce Clause to
regulate even it.
Furthermore, even if Congress does not have power under the
Commerce Clause, a very unlikely scenario, it probably does have
power to regulate under the Spending Clause. The Spending Clause
would allow Congress to impose regulatory conditions regarding
human cloning on all federal spending in this area, including
Medicare/Medicaid and research funds, effectively controlling most of
the industry. And Congress might even be able to force states to ban
cloning by conditioning funds to states on their adoption of anti-
cloning legislation. This is how we got the twenty-one year national
drinking age, and the fifty-five mile-per-hour speed limit. In short, I
conclude that Congress can probably regulate cloning.
Generally, this is where the debate ends, by recognizing
congressional power. But it shouldn't. Twenty years ago, Professor
Lawrence Sager of the New York University Law School pointed out
that not all constitutional rules made by the Supreme Court fully
incorporate what the Constitution means. It is an idea he called
"underenforced norms. 13 Sager's insight is critically relevant to our
issue because the reason that current jurisprudence regarding
Congress's powers is so deferential to Congress has very little to do
13. Lawrence Sager, Fair Measure: The Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms,
91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978).
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with history or constitutional theory. Instead, current deference is
rooted in institutional concerns about the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court tried for the half century preceding the New Deal and
the Roosevelt administration to limit congressional power, and the
result was a disaster. The Court drew very arbitrary, bizarre lines, the
cases did not make any sense, and finally, it abandoned the whole
enterprise during the New Deal, after the Court had suffered
enormous blows to its institutional prestige. Given this history, even
the current members of the Court have acknowledged that there are
real institutional concerns about enforcing the Commerce Clause
strictly, which is why I think it will not happen. That does not mean,
however, there aren't constitutional concerns here. The fact that the
Court is afraid to enforce a portion of the Constitution because they
are not good at it, does not mean that it is not still in the Constitution.
I would argue that the principles underlying federalism, and in
particular the principle that the federal government enjoys only
limited, enumerated powers, suggest that this is an area where
Congress's action might be unconstitutional even if the Supreme
Court won't say so.
This is where my point that all of the arguments against cloning
are moral comes into play. If there is any point to federalism, if the
principle of federalism-that most powers in our system lie with state
governments and that Congress only has enumerated powers needed
to solve national problems-is to be taken seriously, then there
should be a presumption that moral decisions should be made at a
local level. The reason for this is based on a sense that states are
more likely to be meaningful communities than the entire nation,
because state populations are more homogeneous, and are more
likely to agree on moral issues, than the country as a whole. Not
completely-as Senator Ortiz pointed out, a big state like California
has lots of disagreement-but nonetheless there is more consensus
within individual states than there is across the country. Certain
decisions that are purely moral in nature and where there is no
national spillover effect (I don't see any national consequences of
cloning that create a need for national regulation) should be made at
the local level, because it is better that they be made by more
homogeneous communities. That was the basis of Republican theory
200 years ago.
Even today, there are powerful arguments that fewer people are
unhappy about having regulations imposed on them if regulations
vary across the states. That way, states which have conservative views
or liberal views are able to choose one stance and another state with
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most of the population having different views will be able to choose a
different stance.
14
For all these reasons, it would be better if Congress left this issue
alone because none of the traditional arguments for federal action are
present. Furthermore, I would argue that it is constitutionally
incumbent on Congress to take these concerns seriously. These are
not merely policy concerns, they are constitutional concerns, albeit
not concerns the Supreme Court is likely to enforce.
Is Congress going to take its constitutional obligations seriously?
Most probably not. Not because Congress never does so (because it
does sometimes, though not often enough), but because
institutionally this is the kind of situation where it is extremely
difficult for Congress to act on principle. When you have prominent
hot-button issues that are frankly (and I think I agree with Professor
Greely) inculcated with a certain amount of hysteria, going to your
constituents and telling them the real issue is federalism does not sell
very well. The President has a little more capacity to do that. The
President is less subject to immediate political pressure, has more
lawyers working for him (whether that is a good thing or a bad thing,
who knows?) and has use of the bully pulpit to explain his actions in a
way that members of Congress do not. Nonetheless, the lesson of the
last ten years has been that when you talk about hot-button moral
issues, whether it be abortion or cloning or any number of other ones,
actual interest in the principles of federalism and commitment to the
notions of leaving local communities to make their own decisions, is
largely non-existent in Washington. And that is too bad.
What that suggests, is that maybe the Supreme Court is wrong
about its conclusion that it has no institutional role to play here. I
recently read an article where I saw a quote from Justice Scalia
explaining that laws come to the Supreme Court with a presumption
of constitutionality because Congress is a co-equal branch of
government; but if Congress does not take its constitutional
responsibilities seriously, but rather seems to think that enforcing the
Constitution is up to the Supreme Court, then maybe we should not
have a presumption of constitutionality anymore." I think when you
start looking at the things that Congress has been doing recently in
the cloning area, in the abortion area, and in many others, sometimes
successfully, sometimes not, there is a lot to be said for that argument.
14. See, e.g., Michael McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1484,1494 (1987).
15. See Neal Devins, Congress as Culprit: How Lawmakers Spurred On the Court's
Anti-Congress Crusade, 51 DUKE L.J. 435, 440 (2001), (quoting Stuart Taylor, Jr., The
Tipping Point, 32 NAT'LJ. 1810, 1811 (2000)).
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In conclusion, cloning obviously raises profound moral and
philosophical issues (indeed, we've had a whole day of talk about
this). Any time you have that kind of issue (the obvious comparable
issue which comes to mind today is abortion), the big question, and
here I completely agree with Mark Eibert, is, "Who decides?" Who
gets to decide what the correct answer is to a difficult moral question?
This question has lots of possible answers. It could be international,
fight? There are relevant principles in international treaties, and
people have been talking about imposing an international
moratorium on cloning. It could also be national governments that
decide this issue, so that in our case it would be up to the United
States Congress. The issue could also be decided by state
governments, which is more in line with the presumption of
federalism that states have primary authority over most questions,
including moral issues. It could also be resolved by local
governments. After all, on education policy, we tend to leave most
decisions at the local level, so why not cloning? Finally, it could be
the individual who resolves this issue (in other words, we could refuse
to regulate).
There is a lot to be said for all of those positions, but it is my bias
(I admit this is a libertarian bias) that ultimately, absent strong
reasons, one should not impose artificial homogeneity on contested
issues, and so one should minimize imposing rules on people who
disagree with their underlying moral premises. As a result, my bias is
to keep the level of decision making at as low a level as possible. In
the area of cloning, I think there are sufficient moral and other
concerns (and sufficient legal actions already in the works) that it is
unlikely that the decision is going to be left to the individual for now
(however, if the safety concerns about cloning are overcome, that
might change). But even given that, I still think that does not mean
we should go up to the level of national government or international
law. I think we should still try to keep the decision making process as
close to the individual as possible. In our system this means the
states, which admittedly, in a state like California, are not all that
close to the individual, but it is certainly better than Congress.
Thank you.
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